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Abstract
How do asymmetric labor market institutions a⁄ect the volatility of in-
￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials in a currency union? What are the
implications for monetary policy? To answer these questions, this paper sets
up a DSGE currency union model with unemployment, hiring frictions and real
wage rigidities. The model provides a rigorous but tractable framework for the
analysis of the functioning of a currency union characterized by asymmetric
labor market institutions. Positively, we ￿nd that in￿ ation and unemploy-
ment di⁄erentials strongly depend on the underlying labor market structures.
Moreover, asymmetries in labor market structures increase the volatility of
both in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials. Normatively, we ￿nd that the
optimal in￿ ation target should give a higher weight to regions with more scle-
rotic labor markets but with more ￿ exible real wages.
JEL classi￿cation: E32, E52, F41
Keywords: Currency Union, labor market frictions, real wage rigidities,
unemployment, sticky prices, in￿ ation di⁄erentials, optimal monetary policy.
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In￿ ation and output growth di⁄erentials are a big concern for policy-makers. Recent
empirical evidence shows that in￿ ation and output growth di⁄erentials among Euro
Area countries - even when compared with the ones arising among di⁄erent States in
the US - are rather sizeable and very persistent over time. This evidence has attracted
substantial public attention, because it suggests that the adjustment mechanism in
the single currency area may not be working e¢ ciently. Indeed, as emphasized
by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), the importance of these issues ￿can hardly be
overemphasized, given the frequently voiced concern that heterogeneity dents the
solidity of the monetary union itself￿ 1.
Labor market rigidities are often blamed as one of the potential causes behind
the ine¢ cient and asymmetric adjustment of member countries to economic shocks.
The received wisdom is that there is a ￿need for more ￿ exible labor markets in the
context of the EU, particularly at the national and regional levels￿(ECB Monthly
Bullettin, May 2005, p. 71) without specifying what labor market ￿ exibility means.
Moreover, little work has been done, in the context of DSGE models, to analyze how
asymmetric labor market institutions a⁄ect the functioning of the currency area.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze how asymmetric labor market insti-
tutions a⁄ect the volatility of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials in a currency
union and to determine the implications of these asymmetries for optimal monetary
policy. For this purpose, we set up a DSGE currency union model that combines
three key ingredients: (i) monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities in the
goods market, which serve to give a role to monetary policy; (ii) hiring frictions in
the labor market, which generate involuntary unemployment; (iii) real wage rigidi-
ties, which hinder wage adjustments and shift the labor market adjustment from
prices to quantities.
Table 1 shows labor market indicators for selected countries. On average, Euro
Area countries are characterized by heavily regulated labor markets, generous un-
employment bene￿t systems and high unemployment. Looking only at the averages,
however, can be misleading. Labor market institutions vary considerably across
member countries. In 2006, the unemployment rate was 4% in Ireland compared
to around 9% in France and Spain. Employment protection legislation is extremely
tight in countries like Italy, Portugal, France and Spain, but very loose in Ireland.
1Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), p. 6. See, e.g., ECB (2003, 2005), Angeloni and Ehrmann
(2004), Benalal et al. (2006) for some evidence on in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials and for analyses
of the potential causes and policy implications.
1Austria 1.10 1.43 36.5 32.2 5.7
Belgium 1.00 0.65 55.6 38.7 8.5
France 1.40 2.22 9.7 40.2 9.4
Germany 1.30 0.55 25.0 28.2 8.4
Ireland 0.50 0.8 37.8 32.5 4.4
Italy 1.50 2.07 34.9 34.3 7.2
Netherlands 1.10 0.66 23.2 52.5 4.8
Portugal 1.70 n.a. 23.5 42.9 7.8
Spain 1.40 0.17 13.9 37.1 8.7
Av. Euro Area 1.22 1.07 28.9 37.6 8.2
UK 0.35 0.98 31.2 16.6 5.2
USA 0.10 0.32 12.8 13.5 4.7
Japan 1.40 n.a. 21.5 10.7 4.2
Av. Others 0.62 0.65 21.8 13.6 4.7
Table 1. Labor Market Characteristics of Selected Euro Area Countries
Notes: Labor market indicators are taken from various sources. EPL refers to the employment protection
legislation measure (0,2) as constructed by Nickell et al. (2001). Wage flexibility represents the percentage
increase in wages in response to a one percentage point fall in the unemployment rate (source: Nickell 1997).
Union density, benefit replacement rates and unemployment rates are taken from the OECD. The benefit
replacement rate is defined as the average of the gross replacement rates over two earnings levels, three family
types and three unemployment durations. The unemployment rate refers to 2006Q1. The other data refers to the










Wage ￿ exibility (measured as the percentage increase in wages in response to a 1
percent decrease in the unemployment rate) in France and Italy is much higher than
in Spain and in Germany2. Large heterogeneity is also present in the degree of
unionization and in the generosity of the unemployment bene￿t system.
A few currency union models have been proposed in recent years (see, among
others, Benigno, 2004, Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2008, Benigno and Lopez-Salido, 2002,
Altissimo, Benigno and Palenzuela, 2005). The literature has focused on the implica-
tions of di⁄erent degrees of nominal rigidities in member countries. The main result
is that, when asymmetries in the degree of price stickiness are present, an in￿ ation
targeting strategy that gives higher weight to in￿ ation in the "sticky price" region is
nearly optimal (Benigno, 2004). Most of these works assume perfectly competitive
labor markets and thus ignore a fundamental source of asymmetry among member
2The fact that some countries like Italy and France show large degrees of real wage ￿ exibility
might be surprising, but one should keep in mind that the link between nominal and real wage
rigidity is non-trivial and depends on the underlying wage setting mechanism. For example, in
countries with high degrees of price indexation, real wages are relatively sticky.
2countries, namely the wide heterogeneity in European labor market institutions.
Campolmi and Faia (2008) are the ￿rst to integrate labor markets frictions "￿
la Mortensen-Pissarides" into a DSGE currency union model. Their paper, which
studies the link between in￿ ation volatility di⁄erentials and di⁄erent unemployment
insurance coverage, represents an important ￿rst step towards an understanding
of how the transmission mechanism of monetary policy works in the presence of
asymmetries in the structure of labor markets3.
Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), we model labor market frictions by as-
suming the presence of hiring costs, which increase in the degree of labor market
tightness. Real wage rigidities are introduced, following much of the literature, by
employing a version of Hall￿ s (2005) notion of the wage norm. The model provides a
rigorous framework for the analysis of the functioning of a currency union character-
ized by asymmetric labor market institutions. We use the model for three di⁄erent
purposes.
First, we analyze how di⁄erent labor market structures in￿ uence the Phillips
curves of member countries. We distinguish among two types of labor market im-
perfections: unemployment rigidities (UR), which capture the institutions - such as
employment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology - that
limit the ￿ ows in and out of unemployment; and real wage rigidities (RWR), intended
to capture the institutions which in￿ uence the responsiveness of real wages to eco-
nomic activity. These two types of labor market rigidities are found to have very
di⁄erent e⁄ects on the incentives for ￿rms to reset prices and thus on the Phillips
curve. Unemployment rigidities make the Phillips curve steeper. This e⁄ect is strong
and non-linear. Real wage rigidities make the Phillips curve ￿ atter, as in￿ ation be-
comes less sensitive to unemployment changes4. Moreover, as in Blanchard and
Gal￿ (2007, 2008) real wage rigidities create a trade-o⁄ for monetary policy between
in￿ ation stabilization and unemployment stabilization.
Second, we study how di⁄erent labor market structures a⁄ect the adjustment
of member countries to monetary and productivity shocks. The main focus is on
3Other contributions related to our paper include Andersen and Seneca (2007), Poilly and Sahuc
(2007), Dellas and Tavlas (2004) and Fahr and Smets (2008). Andersen and Seneca (2007) discuss
the e⁄ects of asymmetric size, market power and nominal wage rigidities for aggregate volatili-
ties. Dellas and Tavlas (2004) and Poilly and Sahuc (2007) study respectively the implications of
asymmetries for the costs of membership in a currency union and the implications of labor market
reforms on the welfare of member countries in the presence of labor market asymmetries. Fahr and
Smets (2008) analyse the implications of downward wage rigidities for optimal monetary policy in
a currency area.
4In a related paper, Abbritti and Weber (2008) ￿nd empirical support for these ￿ndings.
3the evolution of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials, as these re￿ ect the way
in which economic disturbances are absorbed in the currency union. We ￿nd that
labor market rigidities have a strong impact on the functioning of the currency union.
Unemployment rigidities make it more costly for ￿rms to hire new workers and shift
the adjustment from quantities to prices. A higher degree of UR thus increases
the volatility of in￿ ation di⁄erentials but reduces the volatility of unemployment
di⁄erentials. Real wage rigidities, which shift the adjustment from labor prices to
labor quantities, substantially increase the volatility of unemployment di⁄erentials
whereas they have little impact on the volatility of in￿ ation di⁄erentials.
We also ￿nd that labor market asymmetries matter: asymmetries in UR and
RWR increase both the volatility of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials. This
suggests that asymmetric labor market structures worsen the adjustment mechanism
of a currency union to symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
Third, we investigate the implications of asymmetric labor market structures for
monetary policy and welfare. First, we ￿nd that monetary policy should give a
negligible weight to unemployment. Then we ask whether in the presence of labor
market asymmetries the central bank should respond to in￿ ation di⁄erentials and
￿nd that the central bank should give a higher weight to in￿ ation in the region with
more sclerotic labor markets but with more ￿exible real wages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-5 describe the
model. Section 6 studies how the New Keynesian Phillips curve changes with the
labor market structure. Section 7 studies the positive behavior of the model under
di⁄erent calibrations. Section 8 carries out the normative analysis and Section 9
concludes.
2 The Model
A currency union is a group of regions or countries sharing the same currency, with
a single central bank entitled to conduct monetary policy. To keep things simple,
we consider a currency union consisting of two regions, Home and Foreign, of the
same size (normalized to 1). Each economy, which is populated by identical, in￿ni-
tively lived households, is specialized in the production of a bundle of di⁄erentiated
goods. Production of these goods takes place in two sectors. Wholesale ￿rms pro-
duce intermediate goods in competitive markets and sell their output to monopolistic
retailers. Retailers transform the intermediate goods into ￿nal goods and sell them
to the households. The labor market is characterized by hiring costs, leading to
4involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. Price rigidities arise at the retail level,
while hiring frictions in the intermediate goods sector. There is no migration across
regions. Capital markets are complete. Wages are set in individual bargaining be-
tween the employer and the employee. Countries are symmetric for everything apart
from labor market institutions5.
2.1 Households
The representative household within a country is thought of as a large extended fam-
ily with names on the unit interval. In equilibrium, some members will be employed
and others not; to abstract from distributional issues, we assume that households
pool their income and consumption.
The representative household in country i (i = H or F) maximizes a standard































where variables with star refer to the foreign country. Ni
t denotes the number of
employed individuals in the representative household of country i while Ct and C￿
t



























t , the quantity of the good produced in country j and consumed by residents of
country i, is given by the usual CES aggregator. The parameter ￿ > 1 denotes the
elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within a given country. ￿ 2 [0;1]
is the weight on the imported goods in the utility of private consumption; a value
for ￿ strictly less than 1
2 re￿ ects the presence of home bias in consumption.
Utility maximization for the Home household is subject to a sequence of budget
constraints which, conditional on optimal allocation of expenditures across varieties,
5The basic framework of the currency union is inspired by the work of Benigno (2004) and Gal￿
and Monacelli (2008). The structure of the labor market builds on Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008). The























￿￿ is the home CPI index, V H
t is the nominal payo⁄ in
period t of the portfolio held at the end of period t ￿ 1 and Qt;t+1 is the stochas-
tic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo⁄s, which is common across
countries. W H
t is the nominal wage, T H
t denotes lump-sum taxes and ￿H
t the pro￿ts
received by the Home household, which are the sum of the dividends derived from
retailers. P H
t and P F
t are the Dixit-Stiglitz domestic price indexes of the Home and
Foreign countries. Since the law of one price holds, P H
t represents both the domes-
tic price index at Home as well as the price index of the Home goods imported by
Foreign.
Similar conditions hold for the Foreign country.
2.2 The Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange Rate







The terms of trade, which represent an index of competitiveness, play a central role
in our model. Movements in the terms of trade are crucial for understanding the
response of the economy to asymmetric shocks and the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.


















The real exchange rate RERt is de￿ned as the ratio between foreign and home CPIs







6Implicit in the budget constraint is the assumption that the law of one price holds across the
union.
62.3 International Risk Sharing
Capital markets are complete: each household has access to a complete set of con-
tingent claims, traded internationally. Combining the ￿rst order conditions relative
to state contingent securities in the two countries, we obtain the usual result:









where   = RER0
u0(C￿
0)
u0(C0) is a constant, re￿ ecting initial conditions regarding relative
net asset positions. If PPP holds - i.e. for ￿ = 1=2 -, the real exchange rate RERt = 1
and the marginal utilities of consumption are equated up to a constant  . On the
contrary, when home bias is present, ￿ < 1=2 and movements in the real exchange
rate are re￿ ected in di⁄erent consumption rates. Henceforth, to keep the analysis as
simple as possible, we assume initial conditions are such that   = 1.
2.4 Supply Side
The setup of the supply side of the two countries follows Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008).
There are two sectors of production in each economy. Firms in the wholesale sector
are perfectly competitive and produce a homogeneous intermediate good using labor
as the only input. This output is sold to retailers who are monopolistically competi-
tive. Retailers then transform the homogeneous goods one for one into di⁄erentiated
goods at no cost.
2.4.1 Wholesale Firms and the Labor Market
The wholesale sector in each country is composed of a continuum of ￿rms, indexed









t(j); for i = H;F(
￿)
where the variables Ai
t represent the state of technology in country i.
In each period a fraction ￿
i of the employed loses their job and joins the unem-
ployment pool. Employment in ￿rm j evolves according to
N
i





t(j); for i = H;F(
￿)
where hi
t(j) is the number of new hires for ￿rm j in country i.




t(j)dj is given by:
N
i










t(j)dj denotes the aggregate hiring level.
We assume all unemployed in the family look for a job. The analysis thus ab-
stracts from any transition of people in and out the labor force, which we assume to
be constant and equal to 1. The number of searching workers who are available for
hire in country i, Ui
t, is de￿ned as
U
i
t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
i)N
i
t￿1; for i = H;F(
￿)
while we de￿ne unemployment as the fraction of the population who are left without
a job after hiring takes place, ui
t = 1 ￿ Ni
t.
Labor market frictions are introduced by assuming that hiring labor is costly.
Total hiring costs for a ￿rm in country i are given by Gi
thi
t(j) where Gi
t, the cost per
hire in country i, is taken as given by the individual ￿rm7.
Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), we de￿ne the labor market tightness index

















￿’ ; for i = H;F(
￿)
where ’ > 0 and Bi is a positive constant. This speci￿cation of hiring costs leads to
labor market frictions which are very similar to the ones obtained in the standard
search and matching model8.
The labor market tightness index will be a crucial variable in our analysis. Since
by assumption ￿rms can hire workers only from the pool of unemployed, xi
t 2 [0;1].
Note that, while from the viewpoint of ￿rms the tightness index captures the condi-
tions of the labor market, from the viewpoint of the unemployed it can be interpreted
as the probability of ￿nding a new job in period t, i.e. as the job-￿nding rate. In the
following we use the terms labor market tightness and job-￿nding rate interchange-
ably.
7Gi
t is expressed in terms of the domestic CES bundle of goods.
8See Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), p.7. In the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model the
expected hiring cost is equal to the cost of posting a vacancy times the expected time to ￿ll it. This
expected time is an increasing function of the ratio of vacancy to unemployment, which can also
be expressed as a function of labor market tightness.





t , with PI;t being the nominal price of the intermediate good. Pro￿t

















where ￿t;t+1 = ￿
Ct(St)￿





Pt is the real wage expressed in
terms of the consumption good. Equation (5) states that the real marginal revenue
product of labor (the left-hand side) has to equal its real marginal cost, that now
includes not only real wages but also a component associated with hiring costs. This
new component is composed of two terms. The ￿rst, GH
t , represents the additional
cost the ￿rm faces to hire a new worker; the second - the last term in (5) - re￿ ects
the savings in future hiring costs resulting from increasing the number of employees
today. Given the presence of these two additional terms, the cyclical behavior of
marginal costs in a model with labor market frictions can depart substantially from
that of real wages9.
2.4.2 Wage Determination
The presence of hiring costs creates a positive rent for existing employment relation-
ships. Following much of the literature, we assume that wages are bargained to split
this rent between the ￿rm and the employee, according to their respective bargaining
power.
Let ￿ denote the relative weight of workers in the Nash bargaining for the home
country10. It can be shown (see the Appendix A for details) that the Nash wage


























￿￿ denotes the marginal rates of substitution between consumption
9See Krause and Lubik (2007).





Intuitively, the Nash wage depends on the reservation wage (here given by the
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, MRSt) plus a
￿wage premium￿ , which depends on the size of the rents for existing employment
relationships (the term in curled brackets) and on the workers￿relative share of the
surplus, ￿.
2.4.3 Introducing Real Wage Rigidities
As ￿rst emphasized by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), the introduction of real wage
rigidities considerably improves the performance of the matching models in terms of
the dynamics of the labor market. The Nash bargained wage implies in fact a real
wage volatility which is too high relative to empirical evidence. As a consequence, the
standard matching model ￿nds it di¢ cult to replicate the response of labor market
variables - and in particular unemployment - to productivity shocks. This issue
is especially important for the euro area, which is characterized by a considerable
degree of wage rigidity12.
To solve this problem, we follow much of the literature and introduce real wage
rigidity by employing a version of Hall￿ s (2005) notion of wage norm. A wage norm
may arise as a result of social conventions that constrain wage adjustment for existing
and newly hired workers. One way to model this is to assume that the real wage
W
H;R
t is a weighted average of the desired wage (the Nash bargained wage W
H;Nash
t )
and a wage norm ￿ W H, which is assumed to be the wage prevailing in steady state.

















￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ W
F￿￿￿
(7)
where ￿i is an index of the real wage rigidities present in the economy, with 0 ￿ ￿i ￿
1. As shown by Hall (2005), this wage rule remains within the range de￿ned by the
bargaining set and thus is robust to the Barro (1977) critique.
11The terms of trade appear in the expression for MRSt because here everything is expressed in
units of the domestic price index PH
t .
12See e.g. Dickens et al. (2007) and Du Caju et al. (2008) for some evidence on nominal and
real wage rigidity in the euro area.
102.4.4 Final Goods Sector
In each country there is a measure one of monopolistic retailers indexed by z on the
unit interval, each of them producing one di⁄erentiated consumption good. Due to
imperfect substitutability across goods, each retailer faces a Dixit Stiglitz demand








Retailers share the same technology, which transforms one unit of wholesale goods
into one unit of retail goods, so that Yt (z) = Xt (z). Firms in the retail sector
purchase intermediate goods from wholesale producers at price ￿H
t and convert it
into a di⁄erentiated ￿nal good sold to households and wholesale ￿rms. Notice that
the relative price of the intermediate goods ￿H
t represents the marginal cost for the
￿nal good￿ s producers.
We introduce nominal price rigidity using the formalism ￿ la Calvo (1983). Each
period, ￿rms may reset their prices with a probability 1 ￿ ￿ (independent of the
time elapsed since the last revision of prices). Log-linearizing around a zero in-
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, we get the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
^ ￿
H
t = ￿Et^ ￿
H





t is domestic (i.e. producer prices￿ ) in￿ ation, c mc
H
t = ^ ￿
H
t represents the log
deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value and ￿ = (1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)=￿.
Note that while (8) looks like a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamics
of the real marginal costs are now substantially di⁄erent from the ones of a standard
NK model, as they are deeply a⁄ected by the labor market institutions. In fact,
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where variables with hat denote log-deviations from steady state, variables without
subscript steady state values, ￿ = ￿￿1
￿ is equal to the inverse of the mark-up of
retailers and g is the steady state value of unit hiring costs GH
t . Marginal costs
depend not only on the evolution of real wages, terms of trade and productivity, as
in the standard New Keynesian model; they also depend on current labor market
conditions (xH
t ) and on the future labor market conditions, as captured by the last
11term on the right-hand side.
Moreover, the dynamics of real wages depend on the degree of rigidity ￿ and on
the evolution of Nash wages:
^ w
H;R
t = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ w
H;Nash
t (10)
where, as shown in equation (6), the Nash wage depends on the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption, on the workers￿bargaining power
and on labor market tightness.
Through these two channels, the introduction of hiring costs and real wage rigidi-
ties substantially changes the dynamics of the marginal costs, which in turn in￿ uence
the ￿rms￿optimal price setting and the in￿ ation dynamics.
2.4.5 Market Clearing
Final output may either be transformed in the composite consumption good or used









































dz. Notice that the assumption
of Cobb-Douglas preferences over the home and foreign goods allows us to derive a



















3 The E¢ cient and the Flexible Price Equilibria
In this section we brie￿ y characterize the constrained e¢ cient allocation and the
decentralized equilibrium arising when prices are ￿ exible. This will permit to get
further intuition on the functioning of the currency union and on the role played by
each market imperfection in shaping our equilibrium dynamics.
123.1 The Constrained E¢ cient Allocation
The constrained e¢ cient allocation, which is the benchmark relative to which mone-
tary outcomes will be evaluated, is found by assuming that the social planner maxi-
mizes the welfare of the union, taking as given the technological constraints and the
labor market frictions that are present in the decentralized economy. The solution of
the social planner￿ s problem leads to the following result, which is further explained
in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Employment is invariant to productivity shocks under the constrained
e¢ cient allocation.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
As in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), this invariance is a consequence of the assump-
tion of a log utility function, which implies o⁄setting income and substitution e⁄ects
on the labor supply. The fact that employment is constant is a useful result, as it
implies that all ￿ uctuations in employment are ine¢ cient.
3.2 Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
Under ￿ exible prices, pro￿t maximization by ￿nal goods ￿rms requires P H
t = ￿
￿￿1PI;t
for all t, where ￿
￿￿1 is the optimal gross mark-up. Solving the model under this
condition, we need to distinguish two cases. First, consider the case in which there
are no real wage rigidities (i.e. ￿ = ￿￿ = 0). In this case, the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 2 Under ￿exible prices and no real wage rigidities, employment is in-
variant to productivity shocks. The decentralized equilibrium corresponds to the con-
strained e¢ cient equilibrium only if two conditions are satis￿ed: 1. The Hosios
condition holds, i.e. ’ = ￿ ; 2. Monopolistic distortions in the ￿nal goods market
are eliminated through a production subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008) obtain the same result in a closed economy model.
This invariance is again a consequence of the log utility assumption, which implies
that the wage at home moves one for one with AH
t (St)￿￿. Notice also that since





t . Under ￿ exible prices and wages, asymmetric productivity
shocks at home or at foreign are neutralized by changes in the wage rates and thus
13do not a⁄ect the ￿rms￿incentives to hire people; as a result, unemployment and
labor market tightness are unchanged.13
On the contrary, when real wage rigidities are present wages do not move enough
to absorb the impact of technology shocks. As a result, in a decentralized equilibrium
with sticky wages, employment and the labor market tightness will not be constant.
4 Equilibrium under Sticky Prices
If prices are sticky, monetary policy matters. In a closed economy model, the presence
of staggered price setting leads to an ine¢ cient dispersion of output across varieties.
In an open economy model, price stickiness creates an additional source of distortion:
as prices are not free to adjust, the terms of trade follow an ine¢ cient path in response
to asymmetric disturbances14. In this model, two new elements deeply a⁄ect the
economy: hiring frictions and real wage rigidities. In the following we show that
these elements matter substantially for the dynamic behavior of the economy and,
in particular, for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The model is rich, but still relatively tractable, as it can be closed in eight equa-
tions. Let denote with ^ X the deviation of a variable X from its steady state value,





2 . The demand side of the model
is standard. The evolution of aggregate consumption at the union level is captured
by the union-wide IS equation:
^ c
U
t = Et(^ c
U





t is union-wide in￿ ation and^ {t the common nominal interest rate. While the
real interest rate a⁄ects aggregate consumption, terms of trade movements distribute
production among the two countries and explain consumption di⁄erentials:
^ ct ￿ ^ c
￿
t = (1 ￿ 2￿) ^ st (13)
13It is interesting to note that in￿ ation is not constant under the e¢ cient allocation. Indeed, it
can be shown that in￿ ation di⁄erentials evolve according to
￿ ￿F
t ￿ ￿ ￿H
t = ￿^ aH
t ￿ ￿^ aF
t
Notice, however, that relative price adjustments are not necessarily desirable under sticky prices,
since in￿ ation creates an ine¢ cient dispersion of output across varieties.
14In an open economy model, this problem has typically a (at least partial) solution: the exchange
rate. Movements in the exchange rate in fact may provide some additional ￿ exibility to the terms of
trade. This instrument, however, is absent in a monetary union. See, for instance, Benigno (2004)
and Pappa (2004) for a discussion of the welfare properties of monetary unions.
14Denoting with ^ ui
t = ui
t ￿ ui the deviations of unemploment from its steady state
level ui and using the approximation ^ ui
t = ￿(1 ￿ ui) ^ ni
t, the market clearing condi-
tions can be expressed as:








1 ￿ uH ^ u
H
t￿1 ￿ ￿^ st (14)
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The supply block of the model contains the aggregate supply equations for home:
^ ￿
H
t = ￿Et^ ￿
H
t+1 ￿ h0^ u
H
t + hL^ u
H

































t + ￿^ st
￿
(17)
where the coe¢ cients hi
j are functions of the structural parameters characterizing the
two economies: workers￿bargaining power, hiring costs, separation rates, markups,
degree of nominal stickiness or of real wage rigidity, and so on15.




t we get the following
relationship between the terms of trade and the domestic in￿ ation rates:
^ st ￿ ^ st￿1 = ^ ￿
F
t ￿ ^ ￿
H
t (18)
Equations (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18), together with a speci￿cation
of monetary policy, completely characterize our equilibrium dynamics.
5 Baseline Calibration
In our baseline calibration, we assume that Home and Foreign are perfectly symmet-
ric. The parameters are chosen to be largely consistent with those standard in the
New Keynesian literature. The following table summarizes the values for the key
parameters of our model (for i = H or F):
15The expression for the parameters is given in Appendix A.
15Preferences ￿ ￿
i ￿i ￿i ￿
0:992 0 6 1:2 0:25
Technology Ai ’i
1 1
Labor market ui xi ￿
i ￿i
0:08 0:45 0:071 1
Price and Real Wage rigidities ￿
i ￿i
0:66 0:5
Shocks￿Persistence and Volatility ￿i
a ￿i
a ￿￿a ￿"
0:95 0:007 0:258 0:0015
Preferences: Time is taken as quarters. The discount factor ￿ is set equal to
0:992, which implies a riskless annual return of about 3:3 percent. We assume the
labor supply elasticity to be ￿
i = 0. This is consistent with our model if the members
of the household have homogenous tastes for leisure. The elasticity of substitution
between di⁄erentiated goods ￿i is set equal to 6, corresponding to a markup ￿i = 1:2.
The home bias parameter ￿, representing the share of imported goods on total
consumption, is set to 0:25.
Technology: Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008) we set the parameter ’i in
the hiring cost function, representing the sensitivity of hiring costs to labor market
conditions, to be ’i = 116. The steady state level of productivity Ai is normalized
to 1.
The labor market: In the baseline calibration, we set unemployment in country
i to be ui = 0:08, which is roughly consistent with the average unemployment in
Europe. The job-￿nding rate xi is set to 0:45, which corresponds approximately to a
monthly rate of 0:18. Given ui and xi, it is possible to determine the separation rate
using the relation ￿
i = uixi=((1 ￿ ui)(1 ￿ xi)). We obtain a value ￿
i = 0:071. The
relative bargaining power ￿i is set to 1, which implies that ￿rms and workers have
the same bargaining power. The scaling parameter Bi is chosen such that hiring
costs represent a 1 percent fraction of steady state output, as in Walsh (2005)17.
The parameters ￿i can then be determined using steady state identities.
The degree of Price rigidity ￿
i is set equal to 0:66, consistent with data on price
duration. In the baseline calibration, following Campolmi and Faia (2008) and Blan-
16In order to calibrate ’i, Blanchard and Gal￿ exploit a simple mapping between their model and
the standard search and matching model.







16chard and Gal￿ (2008), we set the degree of real wage rigidity ￿i equal to 0:5.
Shocks: We follow the literature and set the standard deviation of the productiv-
ity shocks ￿i
a to 0:007 and the standard deviation of the policy shock ￿" to 0:0015.
Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) we set the correlation between the
productivity shocks ￿￿a to 0:258.
Simulations of the model with this baseline calibration show that the volatilities
of the model are close to the data. The standard deviation of output, in￿ ation and
unemployment of the euro area are 0.85, 0.5 and 4.59, compared to 0.84, 0.57 and
4.68 in our model18.
6 The Transmission Mechanism
How do labor market structures in￿ uence the transmission mechanism of member
countries to shocks? To answer this question, we distinguish between two types of
labor market imperfections: Unemployment Rigidities (UR), which capture the in-
stitutions - such as employment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching
technology - that limit the ￿ ows in and out of unemployment; and Real Wage Rigidi-
ties (RWR), intended to capture all the institutions - including wage indexation and
the wage bargaining mechanism and legislation - which in￿ uence the responsiveness
of real wages to economic activity. These two types of labor market rigidities, while
often associated, are likely to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the dynamics of the economy:
in the ￿rst case, the rigidity is in ￿labor quantities￿ , while in the second case it is
￿labor prices￿that cannot adjust.
Before proceeding, some details on the calibration strategy are needed. To study
the role of di⁄erent degrees of RWR, we simulate the model varying the index of
RWR (￿i) from 0:1 to 0:9. Calibrating the degree of UR is a more challenging
task, as the overall degree of ￿rigidity￿in the labor market does not depend only
on one parameter but on the entire con￿guration of the labor market. Following
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), we characterize the degree of labor market frictions
by calibrating the steady state unemployment and job-￿nding rates (ui and xi);
the job-separation rate is then determined through the steady state relationship
￿
i = uixi=((1 ￿ ui)(1 ￿ xi)). We de￿ne a labor market as ￿￿ exible￿when the job-
18The standard deviations of actual euro area data are taken from Christo⁄el, Kuester and Linzert
(2009), who use quarterly data for the euro area from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4. Both data and model are
detrended with an HP ￿lter (￿ = 1600). In order to facilitate the comparison, in￿ ation is computed
in a year to year base (^ ￿
yoy
t = logPt ￿ logPt￿4) and the volatility of unemployment is calculated
in percentage terms.












































Figure 1: The Unemployment Rigiditiy (UR) Index
￿nding and the separation rate are high; the opposite holds in a ￿sclerotic￿labor
market. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the three parameters implied by our
calibration strategy. As our UR index increases from 0 to 1, the unemployment rate
increases from 0:05 to 0:11, the job-￿nding rate decreases from 0:7 to 0:2 and the
separation rate decreases from 0:12 to 0:0319. We calibrate directly the job-￿nding
rate and the unemployment rate because these are more easily observable than the
reservation wage or the separation rate. Note also that we keep constant total hiring
costs in steady state as percentage of GDP. This implies that marginal hiring costs
are higher in labor markets with low hiring rates (i.e. high UR). This is consistent
with a view of "sclerotic" economies characterized by institutional constraints on the
hiring process.
To see how labor market structures in￿ uence the transmission mechanism of
member countries to shocks, let￿ s consider the Phillips curve of the home country,
which we rewrite here for convenience:
^ ￿
H
t = ￿Et^ ￿
H
t+1 ￿ h0^ u
H
t + hL^ u
H






t ￿ ￿^ st
￿
(19)
Labor market rigidities a⁄ect the supply side of member countries through their
impact on the parameters hi. In order to facilitate intuition, we concentrate our
attention on the two key parameters:
19Notice that the two extremes of our UR index roughly correspond to the "EU calibration" and
to the "US calibration" in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008).
18￿ The "slope coe¢ cient" h0, which captures the elasticity of in￿ ation to unem-
ployment changes.20
￿ The "trade-o⁄ coe¢ cient" ￿hT, which determines to what extent productivity
shocks and terms of trade movements enter as cost push shocks in the Phillips
curve.
Figure 2 shows how the slope coe¢ cient changes for varying degrees of UR and
RWR. A higher degree of UR has a strong, positive and non-linear e⁄ect on the slope
of the PC. The reason is that with lower job-￿nding rates and separations employ-
ment adjusts less easily to changing labor market conditions. This in turn implies
that marginal costs and hence in￿ ation become more sensitive to unemployment
changes21.
RWR have the opposite e⁄ect on h0: higher degrees of RWR lower the sensitivity
of real wages and in￿ ation to unemployment changes. Note also that the sensitivity
of the slope to RWR is much smaller than to UR, and becomes sizeable only when
UR are high. This suggests that there may be important interaction e⁄ects between
di⁄erent types of labor market rigidities.
While UR have a dominant role in explaining the size of the slope coe¢ cient h0,
RWR are the main determinant of the trade-o⁄coe¢ cient ￿hT
22. In particular, note
that when real wage rigidities are present, ￿ 6= 0, productivity shocks enter directly
as a negative cost push shock in the Phillips curve, leading to large and persistent
unemployment ￿ uctuations.
7 Positive Analysis: The Adjustment Mechanism
A key issue in the debate about the currency union concerns how individual countries
adjust to common or country-speci￿c shocks (see, e.g., EEAG report 2007). Indeed,
after ten years of the Euro, the marked and persistent divergence of growth and
in￿ ation among euro-area economies seems to suggest that the adjustment process
inside the currency area may not be working e¢ ciently.
20In our calibrations, the parameters on lagged (hL) and future unemployment (hF) are small
relative to h0. Therefore, we follow Ravenna and Walsh (2007) and refer to h0 as the slope of the
Phillips curve. While this is clearly an approximation, we believe it to be useful to develop intuition
that will hold throughout the paper.
21See Ravenna and Walsh (2007) for a similar argument in the context of a closed-economy
DSGE model with search in the labor market.
22The e⁄ect of URs on ￿hT is found to be negligeable.
















































Figure 2: Labor Market Rigidities and the Slope of the Phillips Curve
In this positive analysis we study how di⁄erent labor market structures are likely
to a⁄ect the functioning of a currency union. The main focus is on the evolution of
in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials because they show how shocks are absorbed
in the monetary area.
Labor market rigidities can a⁄ect in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials in
two main ways. First, the presence of labor market rigidities may a⁄ect the size and
persistence of unemployment and in￿ ation di⁄erentials following asymmetric shocks.
Second, symmetric shocks may have asymmetric e⁄ects when the two regions have
di⁄erent labor market structures. How do these e⁄ects operate? Are they likely to
be important or negligible? These are the questions we try to adress next.
7.1 The Dynamics of the Currency Union
In this section we describe the dynamic behavior of the model in response to two
types of shocks: productivity shocks (symmetric and asymmetric) and monetary
policy shocks. The monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor-type interest
rate rule:
^ {t = ￿m^ {t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿m)(1:5^ ￿
U
t ￿ 0:25^ u
U
t ) + "t (20)
and where ￿m = 0:85, a value consistent with the empirical evidence on policy rules.23
23See, e.g, Clarida et al. (2000).




































Note: Inflation is annualized.
(c) Inflation differential








































Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an Asymmetric Productivity Shock (Home)
7.1.1 Asymmetric Shocks and Labor Market Rigidities
First, we look at asymmetric productivity shocks, and consider how the transmission
mechanism of the union changes when both the countries have less rigid labor markets
or less rigid wages. Figure 3 displays the responses of in￿ ation and unemployment
to a positive technology shock in the home country for three di⁄erent calibrations:
the baseline calibration (A), a currency union with low UR (B) and a currency union
with low RWR (C).24 On impact, the three economies react in the same direction:
home in￿ ation (^ ￿
H) decreases while home unemployment (^ uH) increases. The latter
is due to the presence of price rigidity. The productivity increase allows ￿rms that
cannot reset prices to produce the same amount with fewer workers; consequently,
unemployment rises on impact. This unemployment increase is short-lived, as over
time more ￿rms can reset their prices and the e⁄ect of the productivity shock fades
away.
24The parameters for calibration B are x = 0:7, ￿ = 0:12 whereas for calibration C we use
￿ = 0:25:















































Figure 4: Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of Di⁄erentials
The home productivity shock is transmitted to the foreign country through move-
ments of the terms of trade and through monetary policy. On the one hand, the
reduction in the prices of the home goods exerts de￿ ationary pressure abroad as
consumers in both countries shift their consumption towards the home good. On the
other hand, the central bank lowers the interest rate, which has a stimulating e⁄ect
on the foreign economy. The overall e⁄ect is an increase of foreign in￿ ation and a
decrease of foreign unemployment.
Putting the impulse responses of the country speci￿c variables together, a positive
technology shock at home leads to a negative in￿ ation di⁄erential and a positive
unemployment di⁄erential (at least on impact).
The labor market structure has an important in￿ uence on the size and persistence
of these di⁄erentials. First, consider the case where both countries are characterized
by a lower degree of UR (B): the in￿ ation di⁄erential decreases by 0.4 percentage
points less and the unemployment di⁄erential increases slightly more when UR are
low. When hiring new workers is less costly, ￿rms ￿nd it relatively more convenient
to absorb a shock through changes in quantities rather than through changes in
prices.
Second, compare the baseline economy (A) to the economy with a lower degree
of RWR (C). A lower degree of RWR has little impact on the in￿ ation di⁄erential,
22but it substantially reduces the persistence of the response of the unemployment
di⁄erential to the productivity shock. As in Hall (2005), when real wages are rigid,
the ￿rms￿share of the match surplus increases strongly with productivity and hence
hiring and unemployment is strongly related to movements in productivity.
In Figure 4 we further assess how the volatility of di⁄erentials depends on RWR
and UR25. A higher degree of UR increases the volatility of the in￿ ation di⁄erential,
but reduces the volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential. A higher degree of RWR
increases the volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential, while the e⁄ect on the
in￿ ation di⁄erential is small and the slope is sensitive to calibration choices.
Labor market rigidities are often blaimed as one of the possible causes of large
and long-lasting in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials in the European Monetary
Union. Our results, however, suggest that it is crucial to distinguish among the insti-
tutions that constrain the ￿quantity￿adjustment (UR) from the ones that constrain
the ￿price￿adjustment (RWR) in the labor market, as these may have very di⁄erent,
and sometimes opposite, dynamic implications.
Result 1 (Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of Di⁄erentials):
UR and RWR have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the volatility of in￿ation and unemploy-
ment di⁄erentials: UR increase the volatility of the in￿ation di⁄erential but reduce
the volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential, while RWR increase the volatility of
the unemployment di⁄erential but have little e⁄ect on the volatility of the in￿ation
di⁄erential.
As shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix, a similar intuition applies for the volatility
of union variables.
7.1.2 Symmetric Shocks and Asymmetric Labor Markets
In this section we analyze the dynamic behavior of the currency union in the presence
of asymmetric labor market structures. We distinguish three cases:
1. Baseline: the member countries share the same economic structures.
2. Asymmetric UR: the home country has more rigid labor markets than the
foreign country. Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), we calibrate the job ￿nding
rates at xH = 0:2 and xF = 0:7 and the separation rates at ￿
H = 0:03 and ￿
F = 0:12:
3. Asymmetric RWR: in the home country real wages are more sticky than in
the foreign country. Speci￿cally, we choose ￿ = 0:75 and ￿￿ = 0:25.
25We simulate the model for di⁄erent calibrations of the labor market and show the standard
deviation of the un￿ltered time series of the in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erential. We include
both monetary and productivity shocks.














Note: Inflation differentials are annualized.























(a.2) Unemployment differential (sym. productivity shock)














(b.1) Inflation differential (monetary policy shock)



















(b.2) Unemployment differential (monetary policy shock)
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Symmetric Productivity shock (a) and a Monetary
Policy shock (b).
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄er-
ential following a symmetric productivity shock (a) and a monetary policy shock
(b). In the symmetric currency union, symmetric shocks do not a⁄ect di⁄erentials
as the response in the home and foreign country are the same. On the contrary, in
the presence of asymmetries, substantial di⁄erentials arise in response to symmetric
shocks. In particular, in the presence of asymmetric UR the in￿ ation di⁄erential
shows a very strong response on impact and then is reversed in the second quarter.
The reason for this pattern is that in the country with lower UR, in￿ ation decreases
less on impact but then is more persistent (see also Figure 3). Asymmetric UR are
also a source of unemployment di⁄erentials as unemployment increases more in the
country with lower UR.
Sizeable in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials also arise in the presence of
asymmetric RWR. Most noteworthy is the substantial decrease in the unemployment
di⁄erential in the response to a symmetric productivity shock. The reason is that
unemployment responds more strongly in the country with rigid real wages.
24Interestingly, asymmetries in the degree of RWR seem to have a bigger e⁄ect on
the adjustment mechanism to productivity shocks, while UR have a bigger impact
on the adjustment mechanism to monetary policy shocks. This is because RWR
mainly determine the extent to which productivity shocks enter as negative ￿cost
push shock￿ in the Phillips curve, while UR only a⁄ect the slope of the Phillips
curve, which plays a key role in the transmission mechanism of demand shocks.
We further analyze how labor market asymmetries a⁄ect the volatility of di⁄er-
entials, holding the average degree of UR and RWR constant. For this purpose,
we construct an index of asymmetry that starts out at 0 where both countries are
perfectly symmetric (the baseline calibration). As the index increases towards 1,
the two countries become increasingly di⁄erent but the average degree of UR and
RWR does not change. The following tabulation shows the values of the underlying
parameters:26






xH= 0:2 = xF= 0:7
￿
H= 0:03 = ￿
F= 0:12
Asymmetric RWR ￿ = ￿￿= 0:5 ￿ = 0:9 = ￿￿= 0:1
Figure 6 shows that the volatility of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials is
increasing in asymmetries in both UR and RWR. The reason is simple and intuitive:
when asymmetries are present, symmetric shocks are transmitted di⁄erently across
member countries and, as a consequence, in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials
arise. Asymmetries in the degree of RWR are found to increase substantially the
volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential (note that we would have to rescale Figure
6 (b)). Asymmetric UR have instead a stronger e⁄ect on the volatility of the in￿ ation
di⁄erential, which is related to the fact that in the presence of high UR ￿rms adjust
to shocks by adjusting prices rather than quantities.27
Overall, these results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen
26See Benigno (2004) and Andersen and Seneca (2007) for similar assumptions.
27In the Appendix Figures 3 and 4, we carry out a sensitivity analysis with respect to the
correlation of productivity shocks. When the correlation of productivity shocks across the two
countries is perfect (￿￿a = 1), the volatility of di⁄erentials is strongly increasing in asymmetries.
This shows that in the presence of asymmetric labor market rigidities it is the symmetric shocks
that drive the di⁄erentials. When the correlation of productivity shocks is equal to zero, the
volatility of di⁄erentials is still increasing except the volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential,
which is slightly decreasing in the degree of asymmetry. Note, however, it is likely that productivity
shocks are more strongly correlated across members of the EMU than in our baseline calibration
(￿￿a = 0:258) because our baseline calibration is based on an estimate of ￿￿a between the U.S. and
a European aggregate (see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992).
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Figure 6: Asymmetric Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of Di⁄erentials
the adjustment mechanism of a currency union to symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
It is important to note, however, that in the presence of asymmetric labor market
structures, monetary policy shocks themselves create terms of trade movements and
are a source of di⁄erentials. Can then the central bank exploit these asymmetries
and gain from responding systematically to di⁄erentials? We try to address this
question in the next section.
Result 2 (Asymmetric Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of
Di⁄erentials):
Asymmetries in UR and RWR increase the volatility of in￿ation and unemploy-
ment di⁄erentials. This suggests that asymmetries in labor markets worsen the ad-
justment mechanism of a currency union to shocks.
Figure 2 in the Appendix shows how the volatility of union variables is a⁄ected by
asymmetries in labor market rigidities. In general, the volatility of union variables is
increasing in the degree of asymmetry. The only exception is the volatility of union
unemployment, which is slightly decreasing with asymmetries in UR.
268 Optimal Monetary Policy
What is the optimal monetary policy in a currency union characterized by asym-
metric labor market rigidities?28 What are the optimal targets for the central bank?
Should monetary policy respond to di⁄erentials? To answer these questions, we
derive a loss function from the welfare criterion of the currency union, which we
de￿ne as the utilitarian social welfare function. A second order approximation to






















































t￿1] + t:i:p: (21)
where t.i.p. refers to ￿terms independent of policy￿ . The derivation for the micro-
founded loss function and the expression for the weights !i
￿;!i
u and !i
uL are given in
the Appendix B. Because of log utility in consumption, welfare losses in each country
are in percentage deviation from steady state consumption. To simplify the analysis,
the approximation of the welfare criterion has been derived under the assumption
that the steady state allocation of the decentralized economy corresponds to the
constrained e¢ cient allocation. This is true if two conditions are met: 1. The Hosios
condition holds, i.e. ’ = ￿ ; 2. Monopolistic distortions in the ￿nal goods market
are eliminated through a production subsidy.
Our micro-founded loss function shows that the central bank of the currency
union should care about (in both countries):
1. The variance of in￿ ation: in the presence of price rigidity, in￿ ation leads to
ine¢ cient dispersion of output across varieties, just like in a standard New
Keynesian model.
2. The variance of unemployment, for two reasons. First, with concave utility
over consumption and employment, ￿ uctuations in employment around the
steady state are undesirable per se. Moreover, in our model hiring is a wasteful
activity in the sense that it consumes output. Since aggregate hiring costs
28See also Benigno (2004) and Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008) for optimal monetary policy in a cur-
rency union in the presence of price rigidities and Thomas (2008) for optimal monetary policy in
an economy with search and matching frictions.
29We deviate from Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008) who eliminate some of the terms arguing that g^ ni
t







t are increasing and convex in aggregate hiring, ￿ uctuations in hiring
(and unemployment) around the steady state lead to higher aggregate hiring
costs and thus higher welfare losses.
3. The autocovariance of unemployment: since hiring is equal to Nt￿(1￿￿)Nt￿1,
one can reduce the volatility of hiring, and thus aggregate hiring costs, by
smoothing employment (and unemployment) across time.





















u is the autocorrelation of unemployment. Then for high values of ￿i
u the




tend to cancel out each other.30 This suggests that policies that aim at reducing
the volatility of unemployment are unlikely to yield large welfare gains even in the
presence of high UR.
The weights on in￿ ation do not depend on the labor market rigidities but only
on the degree of price rigidity. For this reason, the weights on in￿ ation are the same




























































This implies that - holding the variance of union in￿ ation constant - welfare losses are
increasing in the variance of in￿ ation di⁄erentials, which re￿ ects adjustment costs to
shocks in a currency union. When the weights on home and foreign unemployment
are the same, a similar relationship also holds for unemployment di⁄erentials.
8.1 The Policy Frontier
Before evaluating optimal rules and their welfare losses, we illustrate the trade-o⁄s
that monetary policy faces by calculating the policy frontier (i.e. the set of feasible
monetary policy choices). In particular, we focus on the trade-o⁄between stabilizing
30Note that ￿i
u depends on monetary policy and thus the "e⁄ective" weight might depend on
monetary policy itself. We ￿nd, however, that ￿i
u varies very little with monetary policy and the
"e⁄ective" weight is almost identical across all policies considered in this section.
31See Benigno (2004) for an analysis of optimal monetary policy in a currency union with asym-
metric price rigidity.














































Figure 7: The Policy Frontier between In￿ation and Unemployment at the Union
Level
in￿ ation and unemployment at the union level for di⁄erent labor market rigidities
and on the trade-o⁄ between home and foreign in￿ ation in the presence of labor
market asymmetries.
Figure 7 shows how the policy frontier between union in￿ ation and unemployment
varies with di⁄erent degrees of UR and RWR. An increase in UR changes the slope
of the policy frontier, which shifts inside. Intuitively, when labor market are more
sclerotic, in￿ ation becomes more sensitive to labor market conditions and the Phillips
curve becomes steeper. For monetary policy this implies that the trade-o⁄ gets less
severe and the central bank can reduce in￿ ation volatility incurring a smaller increase
in unemployment volatility. To put it in simple words, macroeconomic stabilization
is easier in a more sclerotic currency union. An increase in RWR, on the contrary,
shifts outside the policy frontier (as it increases the trade-o⁄ of monetary policy in
face of productivity shocks) and ￿ attens its slope (as the Phillips curve gets ￿ atter).
Both e⁄ects tend to increase the costs in terms of union in￿ ation and unemployment
volatilities: RWR make macroeconomic stabilization much more di¢ cult.
Figure 8 shows the policy frontier between the volatility of home and foreign
in￿ ation. The slope of the policy frontier is in favor of the rigid country (home) in
the presence of asymmetric UR, but in favor of the ￿ exible country (foreign) with
asymmetric RWR. The same intuition as in the symmetric case applies: in￿ ation is
more sensitive to labor market conditions when UR are high and when real wages
are ￿ exible and, therefore, macroeconomic stabilization is easier in the country with
high UR and low RWR.
















































Figure 8: The Policy Frontier between Home and Foreign In￿ation
8.2 Should Monetary Policy Target Unemployment?
The European Central Bank has often been criticized for not giving enough weight to
unemployment stabilization. Indeed, in our model in the presence of RWR, monetary
policy faces a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing in￿ ation and stabilizing unemployment.
How much weight should the central bank give to unemployment stabilization as
opposed to in￿ ation stabilization? To answer this question, we consider a symmetric
currency union and evaluate the welfare losses of the following two targeting rules:
1. Symmetric In￿ ation Targeting (IT): ^ ￿
U
t = 0
2. Optimized Mixed Targeting (MTopt): ^ ￿
U
t ￿ ￿u^ uU
t = 0
where ￿u is found by optimizing over a grid spanning the interval [0;2].
Perhaps surprisingly, we ￿nd that the optimal weight ￿u is close to zero (< 0:1)
and, except for large degrees of RWR (that is, except for ￿ > 0:8), the welfare
gains of MTopt over the symmetric IT are small (less than 0.001% of steady state
consumption). This result is a consequence of the fact that, under plausible calibra-
tions, the "e⁄ective" utility cost of unemployment ￿ uctuations is much lower than
the utility cost of in￿ ation dispersion.32 To make this point clearer, we evaluate the
32Thomas (2008) and Ravenna and Walsh (2008) ￿nd similar results in closed economy models
with search frictions: real wage rigidities do not provide a rationale for deviating from price stability.
The result that the optimal weight on in￿ ation stabilization is much larger than on employment
stabilization is standard also in New Keynesian models without search frictions (see, e.g., Woodford,
2003).















(wu - ru wuL)























for di⁄erent calibrations of the labor market. Figure 9 shows that while RWR do
not a⁄ect the weights in the loss function, a higher degree of UR strongly increases
the impact of the variance and autocovariance of unemployment on welfare. These
latter two terms, however, tend to o⁄set each other and, for all our calibrations,
the "e⁄ective" weight on the volatility of unemployment is below 2.5 compared to
a weight on the volatility of in￿ ation of almost 17. That is to say, the utility cost
of unemployment ￿ uctuations remains much lower than the utility cost of in￿ ation
dispersion. For this reason, in our model higher UR or RWR do not provide a good
justi￿cation for unemployment stabilization.33
Result 3 (Optimized Mixed Targeting rule)
The optimized Mixed Targeting rule gives little weight to unemployment stabiliza-
tion and, except for large degrees of RWR, the welfare gains relative to a symmetric
In￿ation Targeting rule are small.
33One may argue that the central bank doesn￿ t want to stabilize unemployment but rather changes
in unemployment in order to reduce aggregate hiring costs. To assess this claim we evaluate the
welfare losses of the following mixed targeting rule: ^ ￿
U
t +￿h^ hU
t = 0 where we replaced unemployment
with hiring. We ￿nd that the optimal weight on hiring is close to zero (< 0:1) and, except for large
degrees of RWR (that is, except for ￿ > 0:8), the welfare gains of this mixed targeting rule over
the symmetric IT are small (less than 0.003% of steady state consumption).
318.3 Should Monetary Policy Respond to In￿ ation Di⁄eren-
tials?
In our positive analysis we found that in￿ ation di⁄erentials strongly depend on the
underlying labor market structures. Moreover, our loss function indicates that the
volatility of in￿ ation di⁄erentials yields welfare losses. Should monetary policy there-
fore target in￿ ation di⁄erentials? It is important to point out that in a symmetric
currency union in￿ ation di⁄erentials are independent of monetary policy (see Be-
nigno, 2004). In a symmetric currency union, di⁄erentials can arise in response to
asymmetric shocks, but by its nature monetary policy has only symmetric e⁄ects.
Therefore, targeting in￿ ation di⁄erentials does not yield any welfare improvement.
On the contrary, in the presence of asymmetries in labor market rigidities, monetary
policy creates terms of trade movements and directly a⁄ects di⁄erentials (see the
impulse responses in Figure 5). Should monetary policy then systematically respond
to in￿ ation di⁄erentials? To answer this question, we evaluate the welfare losses of
the following two targeting rules:
1. Symmetric In￿ ation Targeting (IT): ^ ￿
U
t = 0
2. Optimized In￿ ation Targeting (ITopt): ￿￿^ ￿
H
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)^ ￿
F
t = 0
where ￿￿ is found by optimizing over a grid spanning the interval [0;1].34 Note
that one can reformulate ITopt as ^ ￿
U
t + (￿￿ ￿ 1
2)^ ￿
d
t = 0, which implies that for any
￿￿ 6= 0:5 monetary policy responds to in￿ ation di⁄erentials.
We use the same index of asymmetry as in the previous section and compute
the optimal weight in the ITopt rule as we go from 0 (complete symmetry) to 1
(strong asymmetry). We also compute the percentage dead weight loss (PDWL) of
the ITopt rule relative to the symmetric IT rule. Similar to Benigno (2004), the
PDWL is computed as:




where LITopt, LIT and Lopt are welfare losses under ITopt, IT and the optimal mon-
etary policy under commitment.
The results, shown in Figure 10, suggest that the reduction in dead weight losses
by following the ITopt rule can be substantial and that the ITopt rule should give a
34We compute optimal monetary policy under commitment (the "timeless perspective" as in
Woodford, 2003). Note that the optimal monetary policy cannot replicate the e¢ cient allocation
in this model and thus the losses are always larger than zero.
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Figure 10: Asymmetric Labor Market Rigidities, the Optimized In￿ation Targeting
Rule and % Reduction in Dead Weight Loss (RDWL)
higher weight to the country with higher UR but lower RWR. The reason for this
result is related to the slope of the Phillips curve: it is optimal to reduce in￿ ation
volatility in the country where in￿ ation is more sensitive to labor market conditions
(i.e. where the Phillips curve is steeper). This will increase the volatility of in￿ ation
in the country where in￿ ation is less sensitive to labor market conditions, but by
less than one to one. The fact that the trade-o⁄ in the Phillips curve depends on
the real wage rigidity, gives an additional motive for targeting the ￿ exible real wage
country. Targeting the in￿ ation of the country with more sticky real wages - i.e. the
country with a larger trade-o⁄ - creates much more volatility in unemployment and
thus higher welfare losses.
The result that it is optimal to target the region with ￿ exible real wages seems to
stand in contrast with the literature on sticky prices and sticky nominal wages (see,
33e.g., Erceg et al., 1999). In this literature, welfare losses arise because in the presence
of price and nominal wage staggering, in￿ ation leads to an ine¢ cient dispersion of
output across ￿rms and/or ine¢ cient labor supply across households. As a conse-
quence, the weights in the loss function are larger for sticky price countries and thus
it is optimal to put more weight on that country. On the contrary, in our framework,
in￿ ation bears the same costs in both countries because countries are symmetric in
terms of price rigidities. Moreover, real wages are the same across ￿rms, even though
institutional barriers limit the extent to which real wages can adjust and hence de-
termine how responsive in￿ ation is to labor market conditions. As a consequence,
real wage rigidities do not a⁄ect the weights on in￿ ation or unemployment in the
loss function, but only the way in which shocks are transmitted in member states
(as captured by the Phillips curve of the member states).
UR and RWR are thus found to lead to opposite prescriptions for monetary policy.
Do the e⁄ects of asymmetries cancel each other out when the home country has
both high UR and high RWR? More generally, are there interaction e⁄ects between
asymmetric unemployment and real wage rigidities? To answer this question, we
evalute the welfare losses of IT and ITopt for di⁄erent combinations of labor market
rigidities. In particular, we ￿nd the optimal weight and dead weight losses for the
following two economies:
UR = 1 = UR
￿= 0 UR = 0 = UR
￿= 1







The results show that when rigidities are complements, in the sense that countries
with high (low) UR also have high (low) RWR (economy (C) in the table above),
the e⁄ects on the optimal weight o⁄set each other, and a symmetric in￿ ation target
is close to optimal. On the other hand, when rigidities are substitutes, that is low
(high) real wage rigidities side with high (low) unemployment rigidities (economy
(S) in the table), the e⁄ects reinforce each other, so that countries with low RWR
but high UR receive a larger weight in the optimal in￿ ation target and the reduction
in dead weight loss from following the ITopt rule is larger than 80%.
Result 4 (Optimized In￿ ation Targeting rule)
The optimized In￿ation Targeting rule gives more weight to countries with higher
Unemployment Rigidities and lower Real Wage Rigidities. Moreover, when the rigidi-
ties are complements the e⁄ects of asymmetries o⁄set each other, whereas when the
rigidities are substitutes the e⁄ects of asymmetries reinforce each other.
349 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce unemployment, hiring frictions and real wage rigidities in a
standard DSGE currency union model. Our model provides a rigorous but tractable
framework for the analysis of the functioning of a currency union characterized by
asymmetric labor market rigidities. In our analysis we focus on two types of labor
market rigidities: Unemployment Rigidities (UR), which capture the institutions -
such as employment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology -
that limit the ￿ ows in and out of unemployment; and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR),
intended to capture all the institutions - including wage indexation and the wage
bargaining mechanism and legislation - which in￿ uence the responsiveness of real
wages to economic activity. Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis:
First, the two types of labor market rigidities are found to have very di⁄erent
e⁄ects on the incentives for ￿rms to reset prices and thus on the Phillips curve. A
higher degree of UR makes the Phillips curve steeper whereas RWR make the Phillips
curve ￿ atter. The basic intuition is that in￿ ation is more sensitive to labor market
conditions when ￿rms adjust prices rather than quantities in response to shocks.
Second, labor market rigidities have a deep impact on the adjustment mecha-
nism of the currency union to productivity and monetary policy shocks. We focus
our analysis on the volatility of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials, because
they directly re￿ ect the adjustment costs of the currency union to those shocks.
We ￿nd that UR increase the volatility of the in￿ ation di⁄erential but reduce the
volatility of the unemployment di⁄erential, while RWR increase the volatility of the
unemployment di⁄erential and have little e⁄ect on the volatility of the in￿ ation dif-
ferential. Moreover, asymmetries in UR and RWR increase both the volatility of
in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials. This suggests that asymmetric labor mar-
ket structures worsen the adjustment mechanism of a currency union to symmetric
and asymmetric shocks.
Finally, in our normative part we ￿nd that, except for large degrees of RWR,
monetary policy should give a negligible weight to unemployment. We then probe
whether in the presence of labor market asymmetries monetary policy should respond
to in￿ ation di⁄erentials. Indeed, when labor market structures di⁄er among member
countries, the optimal in￿ ation index should give a higher weight to the country with
higher unemployment rigidities but more ￿ exible real wages. We further show that
it is crucial to take into consideration the interactions between institutions at the
two sides of the labor market. When labor market institutions are "complements",
35in the sense that countries with high (low) UR also have rigid (￿ exible) wages, the
e⁄ect of asymmetries tends to o⁄set each other and a symmetric in￿ ation target is
close to optimal. When labor market institutions are "substitutes", that is countries
with low UR tend to have high RWR or viceversa, the e⁄ects of rigidities tend
to reinforce each other and welfare losses increase considerably if the central bank
ignores asymmetries in the labor market.
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Figure 3 : Correlation of Productivity Shocks across Countries  1 =




Figure 4 : Correlation of Productivity Shocks across Countries  0 =
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